Volume 71
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 71,
1966-1967
10-1-1966

Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Recent Cases, 71 DICK. L. REV. 129 (1966).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol71/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

R ECENT CASES

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY OF
SELLER OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCT FOR PHYSICAL
HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER-RESTATEMENT
2D, TORTS, SECTION 402A ADOPTED:
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, unwilling to extend general
liability in assumpsit for breach of warranty beyond the confines of
privity of contract,' has taken a fresh look at the basis of liability
in trespass of the remote vendor to the consumer. After many
assaults the citadel of contractual privity remains steadfast.2 Now,
however, it appears that the advocates of strict liability for dangerously defective consumer goods have been assaulting the wrong
citadel. In Webb v. Zern3 the court adopted Restatement 2d,
Torts, Section 402A, which will have essentially the same effect on
vendors of defective goods in trespass as the abolition of privity
would have in assumpsit. 4 Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property
if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
1. See Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Hochgertel
v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Loch v. Confair,
361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
2.

Id.

3. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
4. One significant difference, however, is that economic loss seems
to be excluded from recovery under § 402A. See infra.
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The court made this significant change in the law without the
urging of counsel. The plaintiff based his cause of action upon the
doctrine of exclusive control and apparently made no attempt to
urge this new basis of liability upon the court.5
The injury to the plaintiff occurred when a keg of beer, purchased by his father and tapped by his brother, exploded as plaintiff entered the room. Plaintiff sued the distributor, the brewer
and the keg manufacturer. The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to join plaintiff's father and brother who were
necessary parties under the doctrine of exclusive control. Since the
statute of limitations had run the court entered judgment. The
supreme court deftly brushed aside the issue of exclusive control
and declared that they were adopting the new basis of liability
enunciated in the Restatement 2d, Torts, Section 402A. The change
was perhaps inevitable, but it is surprising and somewhat disconcerting that it occurred in a case where change was not urged upon
the court.6
It has been said often that it is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects dangerous to
the public.7 The arguments of social policy for placing strict liability upon anyone who markets defective goods appear irresistible.8
Originally it was thought that the swiftest and most logical
route to this destination was through the application of warranty
principles. Warranties, however, have limitations. There must be
some connection, however remote, between the manufacturer and
the consumer for a warranty to exist.9 The unfortunate attempts of
5. Chief Justice Bell in his dissent strongly criticized this "drastic"
change in the law overruling long established precedent and based upon
"a legal theory or doctrine which plaintiff never pleaded or conceived of."
422 Pa. at 429, 220 A.2d at 855. It appears that the court has done plaintiff's pleading for him.
6. The court has resisted changes when the action for injury from
defective products has been brought in assumpsit. In Miller v. Preitz, 422
Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), the court stretched the "family" privily protection of UCC § 2-318 to include an infant nephew of the purchaser who
lived next door. Although the verdict against the retail seller was affirmed,
the case against the wholesaler and the manufacturer was dismissed because of lack of vertical privity. The court felt it could not adopt § 402A
since the action was brought in assumpsit, nor was the court willing to
overrule Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
7. See e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 321 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 15 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor J. concurring). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel.
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). For an exhaustive list of cases supporting this
view see RESTATEMENT 2d, TORTS § 402A (App. 1966), no purpose can be
served by enumerating them here. See also Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383,
221 A.2d 320 (1966) (Roberts, J. and Jones, J. concurring and dissenting in
excellently documented opinions).
8. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 7. It has been said that the seller
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many courts to supply the connection on an ad hoc basis, from the
circumstances of each case, has led to uncertainty as to the status of
the doctrine of privity. The law of products liability in assumpsit
has become fraught with inconsistencies and metaphysical distinctions. 10 Such distinctions are not necessary in trespass where the
duty is one imposed by law from the nature of the undertaking. 1 '
Perhaps the court was prudent in retreating from the quagmire of
warranty and pursuing a fresh path.
The primary objection to this change in the law is directed to
the fact of change, and not its merit. The decision of the court has
been called judicial legislation violative of the doctrine of stare
decisis.12 There is some merit to this criticism when viewed as a
general objection to the vast and rapid changes that have occurred
in recent years in some areas of the law. Stability is a necessary
ingredient of the law, and adherence to precedent provides stability. No one will deny, however, that courts have been legislating
since 1400. Social and economic conditions dictated the law, and
changes in the same conditions may dictate changes in the law.
Unfortunately, changes in conditions have occurred rapidly in recent years, and legislatures have not kept the law abreast. In such
a situation the court must weigh what is to be gained by changing
by marketing his product for use and consumption has assumed a special
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be
injured by it, and the consumer has a right to expect that the product will
be free from dangerous defects. It has also been urged that increased liability will result in increased care. When injury occurs, however, those
who market the product, especially the manufacturer, are better able to
distribute the risk since liability insurance may be procured therefor and
treated as a cost of production.
9. See Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
10. Compare Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 99 A.2d 463
(1964) and Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575
(1963). See Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949). Some courts
have found the "necessary" connection between the manufacturer and the
consumer in the existence of national advertising. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,
191 Pa. Super. 442, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). But what of those firms that do not
advertise? Surely they cannot be allowed to escape liability on that basis.
Subsequent cases must then remove the doubt. Such piecemeal litigation
produces uncertainty and confusion and is therefore undesirable. A single
clear statement of the law is the most equitable and most efficient method
of change. In this respect Virginia has been fortunate. There the demise
of privity was accomplished by legislation, by far the most desirable
method. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Supp. 1966).
11. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1912); Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961).
12. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (Bell, C.J. dissenting). Exceptions were made in the past, however, in food and drug cases.

Stare decisis was on occasion violated, but no one today will condemn the
effect of those decisions.
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the law against what will be lost by retaining it. Uncertainty, it is
true, accompanies change. Adoption of the common sense approach advocated by the Restatement will, hopefully, generate more
confidence in the law than the accompanying uncertainty can destroy. This was undoubtedly the view taken by the court in Webb.
The Restatement is broad but clear in delineating the persons
who may be liable in trespass for the marketing of defective
products which cause injury. 1 3 The caveat, however, introduces
some doubt as to the ultimate extent of liability under section 402A:
"The institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in
this section may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than users
or consumers ... "
It is here that the battle lines will again be drawn though the
defense will be in a considerably weaker position. The greatest
step has been taken. If the court maintains its present liberal
mood there would appear to be no obstacle to extending the section
402A rule of strict liability to anyone within the orbit of risk of a
defective product who is injured by the defect.' 4 The zeal with
which the court adopted section 402A indicates that this extension
is probable. Indeed the extension may have already been made,
since there is no indication that the plaintiff in Webb was a user or
consumer, although he was a member of the household. Surely
his right to recover cannot be made to depend upon whether he
helped to consume some of the beer previously drawn from the keg.
Mr. Justice Eagen appears to be concerned with the ultimate limits of section 402A. In his concurring opinion in Webb he
has suggested that the rule of section 402A be limited to cases of
physical harm to the user or consumer or his property. Justice
Eagen would expressly exclude economic loss from this section
which he feels is dealt with more effectively by the Uniform Commercial Code. 15 Such an admonition appears unnecessary since section 402A specifically states that it imposes "liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his
16
property.'
13. The vendor must be a seller "engaged in the business of selling

such a product." A similar provision is found in the implied warranty
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. See UN-woRm COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314. The extensive comments to § 402A go far to clarify its meaning by discussing such terms as: business of selling, defective condition,
unreasonably dangerous, unavoidably unsafe products, user or consumer,

etc.

14. This would appear to be the trend even though the pressure for
the development of this rule has been consumer oriented and there is not
the same demand for protection of bystanders.
15. Presumably § 2-715.
16. Emphasis added.
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Mr. Justice Eagen also suggests that contributory negligence
or assumption of risk may be a complete defense to the action.
Comment n of section 402A defines and clarifies the nature of that
defense:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the
possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of
contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of
risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of
strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect
and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by
it, he is barred from recovery.
The advocates of greater consumer protection from defective
products will hail this decision as a great stride in social progress.
Those who are concerned with the possible ill effect of a constantly
changing law upon society will condemn such developments as ill
advised, unfair and irresponsible.IT Time will be the final arbiter
of these conflicting prophecies. However, one can but wonder
why the court has chosen to deny this protection in assumpsit while
extending it in trespass. Such judicial hesitancy serves only to
preserve unnecessary distinctions between these outmoded forms
of action.
ALAN R. KRrIm

17. It is generally felt by many manufacturers that it is unfair to
make them insurers of their products. It is also felt that the rule will
subject them to unjustified litigation.

TAXATION-BANKS AND BANKING-CALCULATION
OF BANK SHARES TAX
Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 420 Pa. 393,
217 A.2d 391 (1966).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held, in Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.,' that the Commonwealth is not required to accept prevailing market valuations for
VA and FHA mortgages in a bank's security portfolio, for purposes
of determining the actual value of the bank's shares in the assessment of the bank shares tax. The court approved the Commonwealth's appraising such mortgages at the face amount of the obligation.
The shares tax is imposed on the shares of banks and savings
institutions "at the rate of eight mills upon each dollar of the actual
value" of the shares.2 The shares of title insurance and trust companies are taxed in the same manner. 3 Since the method of computing the actual value of shares is the same under both statutes, 4 decisions regarding the calculation of the value of the shares
both of banks and of trust companies are applicable to the issue.
The actual value of the bank's shares is not to be measured by
the prevailing stock market quotation for the shares in question 5
but rather a formula is provided in the statute: "the actual value of
each share of stock to be ascertained and fixed by adding together
the amount of capital stock paid in, the surplus, and undivided
If
profits, and dividing this amount by the number of shares."
the funds representing the accounts comprising the numerator of
this formula are invested, as naturally they will be, the investments must be appraised in order to determine the actual value of
appraisal must be
the stock. Numerous cases have held that this
7
on the basis of market value and not book value.
1. 420 Pa. 393, 217 A.2d 391 (1966).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1931 (1949).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1991 (1949).
4. Commonwealth v. Butler County Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 66, 101 A.2d
699 (1954).
5. Commonwealth v. Mortgage Trust Co., 227 Pa. 163, 76 At. 5,
(1909); Commonwealth v.Union Nat'l Bank, 44 Pa. D. & C.47 (C.P. 1941).
72, §§ 1931, 1991 (1949).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
7. Commonwealth v. Butler County Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 66, 101 A.2d
699 (1954); Commonwealth v. Union Trust Co., 237 Pa. 353, 85 Atl. 461
(1912); Commonwealth v. First Nat'l Bank, 63 Dauph. 298 (1952), exceptions dismissed, 64 Dauph. 289 (1953), aff'd 378 Pa. 272, 106 A.2d 218 (1954);
Commonwealth v. Provident Trust Co., 55 Dauph. 235 (1944); Commonwealth v. City Nat'l Bank, 52 Dauph. 87 (1941); Commonwealth v. Union
Trust Co., 50 Dauph. 266 (1941), aff'd 345 Pa. 298, 27 A.2d 15 (1942).
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The Mellon case concerned the method of appraising VA and
FHA mortgages held in the bank's investment portfolio. The propriety of the bank's appraising its stocks and bonds at current market value was not questioned. The bank had its VA and FHA mortgages appraised by an independent broker. The appraisal indicated that a substantial market existed for these mortgages and
that their market value was depressed to approximately eighty-four
per cent of their face value. The depressed market value was due
primarily to the issuance by the federal government of a higher
interest rate bond which attracted much of the money that might
otherwise have been available to purchase these mortgages. On
the basis of this appraisal, the bank valued its VA and FHA mortgages below face value in computing its shares tax.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Commonwealth's
contention that these mortgages should be appraised at their face
amount. The court held that actual value means face value and
not market value, stating that nothing in the statute 8 or in the
court's prior decisions required the fiscal officers of the Commonwealth to accept prevailing market values unless doing so would
contribute to a more accurate valuation of the bank's shares. The
court also held that the Commonwealth was correct in adding back
the discounts on mortgages purchased from other lenders. This had
the effect of changing the appraisal of these mortgages from a discounted book value, which represented actual cost and market
value at the time of purchase, to face value.
In Commonwealth v. Butler County Nat'l Bank9 and Commonwealth v. Union Trust Co.,1o the court had held that the market
value of the securities had to be used when it exceeded book value.
Relying on those cases, the dissent stated that the Commonwealth
has no "right to ascertain the actual value of a bank's capital stock
by use of market value when that method of determination of
value is to its advantage, but to ascertain actual value on the basis
of book value when that method of valuation would be more profitable taxwise." 11 The dissent also noted that the Commonwealth
produced no testimony to justify valuation of the mortgages in
question at face value when an active market existed for them, in
which they were selling substantially below face value. Nor was
there any justification, observed the dissent, for using a different
measure of value, i.e., market value, for the bank's other investments.
8.
9.
10.
11.

PA.
376
237
420

STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1931 (1949).
Pa. 66, 101 A.2d 699 (1954).
Pa. 353, 85 Ati. 461 (1912).
Pa. at 397-98, 217 A.2d at 393.
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The Butler case concerned the valuation of stocks in the bank's
investment portfolio for purposes of computing the bank shares tax.
The court there held that actual value of a bank's shares included
unrealized appreciation on its investments, based on current market
value, and is not limited to book value. Union Trust Co. involved
the valuation of bonds which the bank had previously purchased at
a discount. The court there held that the Commonwealth was correct in increasing the valuation to face value on the ground that
this more accurately represented actual, or market value.
The majority in Mellon attempted to minimize the significance
of these cases by stating that they merely stand for the proposition
that the taxing officials must view each case with the single purpose of determining the actual value of the shares. The court
seemed to ignore the fact that these cases held that actual value is
best determined by market value where stocks and bonds are concerned. If market value is the proper measure for securities, it
should also be the standard for other types of investments. It is
true that market quotations are more readily available for stocks
and bonds than for mortgages, but this is no reason to disregard
market valuations for mortgages once they have been established.
The court, however, took exception to the taxpayer's seeking to
value its VA and FHA mortgages in the same manner as securities,
stating that the act does not require the Commonwealth to accept
market values unless doing so would contribute to a more accurate
determination of the actual value of the bank's shares. The court
concluded that the bank's shares were more accurately valued by
means of the Commonwealth's appraisal.
The Mellon court gave three reasons for so concluding. The
first was that the bank's actual experience with this type of mortgage reflected a very small percentage of forclosures. Moreover,
the bank generally held them until maturity, thereby realizing the
face amount of the obligation. Secondly, the court noted that the
bank continued to value its conventional mortgages at book or face
value, and finally it stated that the depressed values of the mortgages were the result of an unusual or temporary market situation
and not the result of any real loss in value.
The fallacy of the court's reasoning lies in its construing mortgages as being different from other fixed income investments, such
as bonds. Bonds, preferred stock and mortgages will fluctuate in
value inversely with the price of money. As the interest rate increases, the value of such investments will become depressed.
However, if held to their maturity date, the face amount of the
bonds and mortgages can always be obtained, barring default, regardless of the prevailing interest rate. Bearing this in mind, it is
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clear that a uniform system of appraisal cannot value bonds at
market value and mortgages at their face amount. One method or
the other must be used. As has been stated, market value has repeatedly been held to be the proper standard.
It is interesting to note that among the bonds which are valued
at market are obligations of the United States Government. When
the value of these bonds declines below face value, due to an increase in the price of money, they are properly appraised below par,
while at the same time a mortgage must be continued to be appraised at face value. Certainly the holder of the government bond
is no less likely to ultimately recoup his original investment than
is the owner of the mortgage.
This is not to say, however, that the test is whether or not the
face amount of the obligation will ever be received. In Commonwealth v. First Nat'l Bank,12 the Commonwealth fixed the actual
value of the bank's bond investments at market value, which exceeded the face value of the bonds. The bank claimed that this
violated the statute 3 because the unrealized appreciation added
nothing to the shareholders' equity, arguing that the bonds were
long term investments which were purchased with the intent to
hold them to maturity and therefore their true worth to the bank
and its shareholders was not an appreciated value, which could be
realized only on a sale, but rather their face value.
The court's reply to this argument is also pertinent to the
Mellon case:
In answer to appellant's position, we wish to reiterate
that the shares tax is a tax on the actual value of shares of
capital stock of the banking corporation as of the date...
and that the actual value of the taxed shares is dependent
upon the actual value of the assets.
The test of actual value of an asset of a banking corporation as of a certain date is neither whether the asset
will be retained a long or short period of time nor whether
the appreciation representing the excess of selling price on
the security market over cost will ever be realized; the test
of actual value is what is a reasonable
sum which will re14
flect the material worth of the asset.
This statement clearly indicates that actual value is properly
determined as of the time of valuation, not the time of maturity.
Therefore it is immaterial that the Mellon Bank generally held its
mortgages until maturity and ultimately received face value for
them. It is also immaterial that the depressed value of Mellon's
12. 63 Dauph. 298 (1952), exceptions dismissed 64 Dauph. 289 (1953),
aff'd 378 Pa. 272, 106 A.2d 218 (1954).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1931 (1949).
14. 63 Dauph. at 304 (Emphasis added.)
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mortgages was the result of a "temporary" market situation, because the only market situation that was pertinent was the market
at the time of valuation. Moreover, it is meaningless to minimize
the importance of a market situation as being "temporary" since the
market is constantly fluctuating and therefore is never permanent.
Finally, the Mellon court failed to recognize the fundamental
differences between VA and FHA mortgages on the one hand and
conventional mortgages on the other. VA and FHA mortgages are
at lower interest rates than conventional mortgages. Therefore
they are more subject than conventional mortgages to a decline in
value as the price of money increases. No doubt the reason Mellon
Bank continued to appraise its conventional mortgages at face value,
while valuing its VA and FHA mortgages at less than face, was
because the former were only slightly, if at all, affected by the intervening government bond issue.
One other important distinction between the mortgages at issue
in this case and conventional mortgages must be recognized. VA
and FHA mortgages are insured by the Federal government. If
the mortgagor defaults and the bank is unable to realize the full
amount of the loan by means of a foreclosure sale, the insurance
pays the balance. Obviously the bank cannot possibly lose its investment with mortgages insured by the Federal government.
Therefore the fact that the bank's experience reflected a negligible
percentage of forclosures is of no significance.
The fact that VA and FHA mortgages are insured, although
not mentioned by the Mellon court, would seem to substantiate
the majority's holding that they should be appraised at face value.
It should not be forgotten, however, that the determinative value is
as of the valuation date, not at some maturity date in the future.
Moreover, if VA and FHA mortgages are to be appraised at face
value because they are insured by the Federal government and
face value must ultimately be realized regardless of whether the
obligor defaults, then certainly government bonds, which are presently appraised at market value, must also be appraised at face
value, since they are direct obligations of the same government
that insures the mortgages.
To value such securities at face would defeat the meaning of
the statute as far as "actual value" is concerned. "Actual value"
can only mean the value of the security at the time the determination is made. If the bank's mortgages are worth less than their
face amount, then an appraisal at an amount other than their market value cannot reflect their actual value regardless of whether
they are held to maturity.
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It appears that there is no valid reason to distinguish between
bonds and mortgages when appraising a bank's investments for the
purpose of computing the bank shares tax. Should the question be
presented again, it might be well for the supreme court to recognize
the fundamental nature of all fixed income investments, including
both bonds and mortgages, and their relationship to the money
market.
EDWARD P. NAJARIAN

FEDERAL COURTS-VENUE-JONES ACT
Pure Oil v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
Suarez, a seaman, brought an action against Pure Oil in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered in the
course of his employment on the steamship "Pure Oil." He sued in
negligence under the Jones Act and alternatively on the theory
that the vessel was unseaworthy. Pure Oil moved to transfer the
case to the Northern District of Illinois on the ground that venue
was improper in Florida. The District Court denied the motion and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. 1 Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was granted 2 in order to determine whether the
decision below was inconsistent with the Court's holding in Fourco
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.,3 and to resolve a conflict
among the circuits.

4

The Jones Act specifically provides that: "Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located."5 Although this provision literally 6 speaks of "jurisdiction,"
it has long been held to refer only to venue.
Respondent conceded that the Jones Act venue provision as
originally interpreted would not authorize Florida venue in this
case since corporate "residence," in the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, traditionally has meant place of incorporation. 7 Standing alone, the specific venue provision of the Jones Act
clearly limits venue in a suit against a corporate defendant to federal forums in the state of defendant's incorporation or where defendant maintained its principal office.
In the 1948 revision of the Federal Judicial Code, however,
the definition of "residence" for venue purposes was redefined and
expanded in a general venue provision (section 1391(c) ) so that:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which
1. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1965).
2. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 382 U.S. 972 (1966) (memorandum deci-

sion).
3. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
4. Compare Leith v. Oil Transp. Co., 321 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1963),
with Fanning v. United Fruit Co., 355 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1966); and Pure
Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1965).
5. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
6. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
7. See Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948).
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it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporations for venue purposes."
The extent, however, to which the new definition was applicable to
existing venue provisions using the term "residence" was not stated
in the revision. It has been left to the courts to decide whether
Congress intended the new, expanded definition to apply to all suits
involving corporations or merely to situations not already covered
by specific venue statutes. Since the defendant in Pure Oil was
admittedly doing substantial business in Florida, the issue of venue
turned on whether the expanded definition of "residence" of the
general venue statute was to be read into the Jones Act provision.
While the Supreme Court had never passed on the issue as to
the Jones Act, it had faced a similar question in the area of patent
infringement. In 1958, in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods.
Corp.,9 the Court held that the specific provision controlling venue
in patent infringement actions "isnot to be supplemented by ...
''1
0 The venue provision of
provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 1391 (c).
the patent infringement statute stated, like the Jones Act, that the
suit could be brought in the judicial district where the corporate
defendant "resides." Many courts thereafter applied the Fourco
rationale to other specific venue statutes, holding that the expanded definition of the general statute did not supplement those
specific provisions."
Prior to Fourco, every court which had faced the question held
that the expanded definition of "residence" in section 1391(c), was
12
to be read into the specific venue provision of the Jones Act.
After Fourco, however, the circuit courts split on the question. The
first case to consider the application of Fourco to the Jones Act was
8.

9.
10.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1964).

353 U.S. 222 (1957).
Id. at 229.

11. E.g., Zonolite Co. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Pa.
1962) (venue in suits to set aside or enforce I.C.C. Orders); R.J. Coulter
Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Burial Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Tenn.
1960) (special venue provisions of the Clayton Act); United Transit Co.
v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 856 (M.D. Tenn. 1957) (civil actions against
the United States. Most textwriters deemed the Fourco rationale controlling whenever special venue statutes were in issue. See 1 BARRON &
See also 1 MooRE,
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACT7c1E & PROCEDURE, § 80 (1960).
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, Par. 0.144[9], at 1632 (1965), criticizing Fourco.
12.

See Hutchison v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 217 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.

1954); Franklin v. Tomlinson Fleet Corp., 158 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ill. 1951);
Phillips v. Pope B. Talbot, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Mincy v.
Detroit and Cleveland Nay. Co., 94 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Neset v.
Christensen, 92 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Bounds v. Streckfus Steamers,
Inc., 89 F. Supp. 242 (D. Del. 1950); Bagner v. Bledberg Rothchild Co., 84
F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
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Leith v. Oil Transp. Co."3 There plaintiff-seaman attempted to
bring suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania where the defendant was "doing business." The defendant corporation was incorporated and maintained its principal place of business in Louisiana. The court held that Fourco was controlling, that the expanded definition of "residence" was not applicable to the Jones
Act, and that venue was not proper in the Pennsylvania federal
forum. The Fifth Circuit in Suarez reached a contrary result.
Distinguishing between the patent infringement and Jones Act
venue provisions, the court held the expanded definition was applicable to the Jones Act and venue was proper in Florida.
Although the court in Leith read Fourco as an all pervasive
ruling that specific venue provisions prevail over the general in
all cases involving the 1948 revision, the Fifth Circuit felt that "the
Court [in Fourco] contemplates an analysis of the relationship
of 1391(c) to special venue statutes in light of the history and purpose of the special venue provisions."'1 4 The court concluded that
while the special venue section applicable to patent infringement
actions was intended as a restrictive measure, designed to place
greater limits on venue in such cases, such was not the case under
the Jones Act.
The Fourth Circuit in Fanning v. United Fruit Co., 5 decided
two weeks before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pure
Oil, adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning:
It seems wholly opposed to the purposes of the Jones
Act to construe its venue provision more narrowly than the
general venue statute, and thus afford to the defendantemployer in a Jones Act suit a means of escape that would
not be available to it in a diversity suit. To limit an injured
seaman's access to the federal courts by a narrowing construction of the Jones Act venue provision would in this
and many other cases work an emasculation of the statute,
depriving its intended beneficiaries of the federal remedy
made available to them by Congress.
Viewing the situation as a whole, we perceive no unfairness or inconvenience in continuing, as before Fourco, to
subject the defendant to suit in the district where it is doing
business. There would be obvious unfairness in requiring
the plaintiff to sue in the district of the defendant's incorporation or of its principal office. Usually neither of these
places is as related to the events in dispute or as convenient
for the trial as the place where the corporation is actually
doing business. 16
13.
14.
15.
16.

321
346
355
Id.

F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1963).
F.2d at 895.
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1966).
at 149.
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In holding that Fourco did not control the instant case, the
Supreme Court stated that the patent infringement venue provision was specifically designed to narrow venue. The 1948 revision
was not intended to change the purpose and letter of the original
enactment. On the other hand, the court noted, the question of
limiting venue under the Jones Act had never been contemplated
by the legislature. That Act was intended to enhance seamen's
remedies against employer's and provide additional federal forums.
This is evidenced by the fact that the specific venue provision of the
Jones Act provided a more generous choice of forum than would
have been available under the general venue statute then in effect.'
The decision in Pure Oil enhances the protection of seamen
who sue under the Jones Act. While a seaman may plead both the
Jones Act and unseaworthiness and go to trial on both theories, he
must elect to present his entire cause of action either as a civil
action under the Jones Act or as a libel in admiralty."' If he
brings a libel in admiralty, he is not affected by Jones Act venue
provisions. 19 By filing a libel in admiralty, however, the seaman
gives up the right to jury trial provided by the Jones Act. Alternatively, the seaman might bring suit in a state court, and retain
his right to jury trial, but lose the possible procedural advantages
of federal forums. 20 These would often be the only choices for an
injured seaman if the cost and inconvenience of bringing the action
in the defendant's state of incorporation or location of his principal
office were prohibitive. Pure Oil, however, will enable the seaman
to proceed more easily under the Jones Act in a convenient federal
forum, often at the location of his injury. The advantages in bringing suit and in avoiding travel and transportation of witnesses and
evidence will be of immeasurable aid to many seamen. The result
seems clearly justified in view of the remedial goals of the Jones
Act and the federal courts' protective attitude toward seamen.
Although Pure Oil will have immediate effect in suits under
the Jones Act, the decision obviously will be felt in other areas.
Whether the expanded definition of residence is to supplement
other specific venue provisions utilizing "residence" terminology
will no doubt be questioned in other areas of statutory law. In
Pure Oil, the Supreme Court has prejected a simple answer to the
17. Pure Oil v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
18. See Balodo v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 179 F.2d 1943 (2d Cir. 1950);
McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. C.D. Malloy & Co., 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1941);
2 NoRRis, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 675 (2d ed. 1962).
20. Bainbridge v. Merchant's & Miner's Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278
(1932).
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question. In the absence of a legislative history or other indication
of congressional intent to limit venue in suits under the act in question, the expanded definition of "residence" found in the 1948 revision is to supplement the specific venue provision in question.
RuDoLPH ZIEGER, JR.

IMMUNITY-CHILD LIABLE FOR TORTS COMMITTED
AGAINST PARENT: CONFLICTS-LAW OF
PARTIES' DOMICILE GOVERNS
Balts v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966).
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Balts v. Balts1 has held that
parent-child tort immunity is not a valid defense to actions brought
for torts committed by the child against a parent. The court also
decided that in such intrafamily cases, the law of the state of the
parties' domicile, not the law of the place of the tort, will determine
whether family immunity is a valid defense to tort claims by a parent against a child.
The plaintiff in Balts brought an action in Minnesota against
2
her son for injuries sustained in a Wisconsin automobile accident.
Both plaintiff and defendant were members of the same household
domiciled in Minnesota. Plaintiff successfully moved to strike from
the answer the defense of tort immunity. The supreme court affirmed the decision and abrogated the defense of intrafamily immunity in all actions by a parent against a child for torts committed after April 1, 1966.
LAW OF THE PARTIES' DOMICILE CONTROLS

The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws states: "The
law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury. ' Many jurisdictions, however, are now departing from the old Restatement rule and are applying the law of
4
the parties' domicile to torts committed in other jurisdictions.
rn the landmark decision of Emery v. Emery,5 two unemancipated
children and their mother sought to recover damages in their
state of domicile against the father and an unemancipated brother
1. Balts v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966).
2. At the time of the accident the son was unemancipated, but when
action against the son was commenced in 1963, he had reached the age of
twenty-one.
3.

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934).

4. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wartell
v. Formusa, 34 111.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fabricius v. Horgen, 132
N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376,
82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439
(1963); Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); McSwain v.
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1965); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d
408 (1965).
5. 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
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for injuries sustained in an out-of-state automobile accident. The
court held that the law of the docimile state governed the question
of intrafamily immunity and the place of the wrong was treated as
extraneous and fortuitous.6 The court stated:
[D] isabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of the family
domicile. That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only state in which the parties can, by
participation in the legislative processes, effect a change in
those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights,
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by
the family relationship should constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries during temporary
absences from their home. 7
In Baits, the Minnesota Court joins nine other jurisdictions8
which have explicitly or implicitly accepted the Restatement's tentative draft.9 These courts are moving in the direction of uniformity which the Restatement is designed to achieve, minimizing
the chance of "forum shopping" and deciding the question in the
jurisdiction which has the most significant effect on the parties
involved.
In support of lex loci delicti it has been argued that the rights
of the parties are vested by the law of the state of the tort. 10 This
vested right theory appears to be a mechanical methodology which
emphasizes certainty and predictability at the expense of other
more relevant considerations. 1 If a tort has been committed, a
claim arises and it is only the remedy which is barred by application of the intrafamily immunity doctrine.
In the Baits case, the automobile was registered, insured and
garaged in Minnesota, and thus any economic changes arising from
the litigation would affect a Minnesota family and a Minnesota insurer. The court realized that uniformity and certainty could best
be achieved by applying the law of the state where the parties
were domiciled at the time of the event. This approach will as12
similate American conflicts law to that prevailing elsewhere
6. Ibid.
7. 45 Cal.2d at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.

8. See cases cited note 4 supra.

9. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Tentative Draft No. 9, § 379 provides: "(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their
rights and liabilities in tort."
10. See McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1965).
11. Id. at 93, 681.
12. For English and Canadian law, see STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
205, 210 (2d ed. 1951); Cowen, The Locus Delicti in English Private Inter-
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and will reflect all of the factors relevant to the issues rather than
"blindly defer to a state which may have experienced only a trivial and transitory brush with the parties to the litigation."'1
PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY ABOLISHED

Traditionally, the Anglo-American courts have been reluctant
to entertain intrafamily suits. Early writers, commenting on child
versus parent tort actions, expressed concern for parental discipline
if such actions would be allowed. 14 The immunity between parents
and children evolved from an 1891 Mississippi case which ruled
that such suits were against public policy. In Hewlett v. George,'5
the court refused to allow a minor unemancipated child to maintain
a false imprisonment action against her parent. The court, citing no
authority, based immunity on protection of parental authority and
family and social peace.'" Despite wide criticism, Hewlett was
adopted and followed by the majority of American courts. 7 Furthermore, the rule has been applied with almost complete uniformity to negligently inflicted personal torts in every jurisdiction
where the question has arisen.' 8 Under the immunity rule, suit
national Law, 25 BIT. Y.B. INT. L. 394 (1948); Spence, Conflict of Laws in
Automobile Negligence Cases, 27 CAN. BAR REV. 661 (1949).
13. 142 N.W.2d at 71.

14.

1

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

*452;

REEVE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS

420 (1874).
15. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
16. Ibid.
17. See, e.g., McKelvey v.McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Prosser, Torts, 676 (2d
ed. 1955).
18. See Owens v. Auto. Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937);
Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App.2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Shea v. Pettee,
19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1954); Strahorn v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 123 A.2d 107 (Del. Super. 1955); Strapleton v. Strapleton,
85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.W.2d 156 (1951); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566,
142 N.E. 218 (1924); Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. App.
1954); Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 Atl. 753 (1937); Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88
(1926); Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931); Durham v.
Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So.2d 807 (1956); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211,
99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563
(1954); Becker v. Rieck, 19 Misc.2d 104, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Krohngold v.
Krohngold, 181 N.E. 910 (Ohio App. 1932); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282,
218 P.2d 445 (1950); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957);
Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Parker v. Parker,
230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956); Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, 66 S.D. 167,
280 N.W. 206 (1938); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170
(1953); DeLay v. DeLay, 54 Wash.2d 63, 337 P.2d 1057 (1959); Securo v.
Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d 44, 93 N.E.2d 867 (1959); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29,
269 P.2d 302 (1954).
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by a parent against a child is prohibited only as to torts committed
while the child is an unemancipated minor. 19 Thus, an emancipated
minor may sue and be sued by his parents for torts committed.20
In 1932, Missouri, in Wells v. Wells 2 1 decided the immunity
question contrary to the general rule. In Wells, a mother was allowed recovery against her minor son for injuries arising from the
negligent operation of an automobile. The court reasoned that all
of the arguments asserted to support immunity would be equally
applicable in property and contract actions, yet no immunity exists
in such cases. Thus the tort action was not distinguished so as to
warrant immunity.2 2 In 1963, Wisconsin, which permits tort actions between spouses, abolished parental immunity in GolleT v.
White.2 s The decision, however, does not apply to negligent acts
involving a right of parental authority or the exercise of ordinary
parental discretion in providing food, clothing, housing and other
care. 24 In a case, very similar to Balts, the New Hampshire court in
1965 held that an unemancipated minor was not immune from
liability to his mother for injuries she sustained in an accident due
to the son's negligence. 25 Although there are strong and persuasive
few decisions stand alone in
dissents in many recent cases,2 these
2
abolishing parent-child immunity.

Preservation of family peace and tranquility is often asserted
in support of the immunity rule. 28 This argument, however, ap19. Emancipation of a child is the relinquishment by the parent
of control and authority over the child, conferring on him the right
to his earnings and terminating the parent's legal duty to support
the child. It may be expressed, as by voluntary agreement of
parent and child, or implied from such acts and conduct as import
consent; the emancipation of a minor is not to be presumed and
must be proved....
1 SCHOULER,

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS,

897

(6th ed. 1921).
20. See LoGalbo v. LoGalbo, 138 Misc. 485, 246 N.Y.S. 565 (1930).
21. 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
22. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
23. 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
24. Ibid. This decision was given prospective application only, except
as to the parties to the action.
25. Guadreau v. Gaudreau, 215 A.2d 695 (N.H. 1965).
26.

See Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Badi-

gian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1960); Chaffin v. Chaffin,
239 Ore. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65
(1957).
27. A few courts have abandoned immunity in cases of intentional or

willful and wanton torts, claiming that domestic tranquility has already
been breached, and that parental authority does not extend to such be-

havior. See Buttram v. Buttram, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958);
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 111. App.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 219 P.2d 445 (1950).

28.

See Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Mesite
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pears unsound since suits are permitted between parents and children in contract and property disputes and presumably result in
some type of family discord. 29 The inconsistency is apparent. If
family tranquility does not require immunity in intrafamily contract or property disputes, it does not require immunity in tort
actions either.
The logic of the "family peace and tranquility" argument is also
weakened in the light of certain cases allowing intrafamily suits
among members of the family who are not directly involved in the
true parent-child relationship. 30 In Balts the court felt that family
harmony would not be disrupted by allowing the action. The
court stated that ".

.

. the prospect of reconciliation is enhanced

as much by equitable reparation as by denying relief altogether,
particularly where the defendant is insured." 31 The court noted
that where a child is protected by liability insurance there could
by a parbe a greater chance of friction, resentment and discord
2
ent's failure to assert a claim than by instituting suitY

Another reason given for upholding the immunity doctrine is
that the ability of the parent to discipline the child would be impaired.33 Suits by the parent against the child, however, would not
impair the exercise of these rights. 4 Nevertheless, some cases have
disallowed such actions contending that there should be mutuality
of remedy. 5 This mutuality argument fails to consider the fact
that in the relationship of parent and child, the rights, duties and
v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929); Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E.
12 (1923); Briggs v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 Atl. 871
(1934); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Ati. 198 (1925); Securo v.
Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212
N.W. 787 (1927).
29. See PROSSER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 8.13 (1956).
30. See, e.g., Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957) (suit between
husband and wife); Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242
(Super. Ct. 1959) (stepson against stepfather); Hamburger v. Katz, 10 La.
App. 215, 120 So. 391 (1928) (father against son-in-law); Courtney v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938) (wife against husband); Bielke
v. Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932) (minor brother against adult
brother).
31. 142 N.W.2d at 73.
32. Ibid.
33. See Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Cannon
v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N.W. 787 (1927).
34. There have been cases stating that an action by a parent against
a child is even more unseemingly than one by a child against a parent. See,
e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, supra note 33.
35. See Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613
(1948).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

privileges of each have always and quite naturally been unequal.
The court in Baits hardly concerned itself with the discipline and
mutuality arguments.
Many courts have disallowed intrafamily litigation because of
the possibility of fraud and collusion between the injured party and
the tortfeasor where there is liability insurance.36 This argument
does not seem convincing since personal tort suits between certain
members of the family are allowed, 7 yet the objection of collusion
and fraud is not raised in such actions. In Baits, the court noted
that insurance does not create a claim where none otherwise exists.
It stated, however, that "the presence or absence of insurance is obviously an important, if not decisive, factor in deciding whether an
intrafamily action will be commenced."3 8
Finally, it is claimed that abolition of immunity will invite a
flood of insubstantial suits.A9

Frivolous or tenuous suits may be

40
brought in any field of law, as for example, libel and slander.
The courts are just as competent to cull out worthless actions in
intrafamily tort suits as in any other type of suit. In Baits, the
court felt that removal of the immunity barrier would not encourage a large amount of vexatious actions. The court noted that
where serious harm has resulted from torts "of such an aggravated
nature that a member of a family would have a right to recover or
would be liable if the adversary were a stranger, public policy requires that the41wrong be righted within the family group by suit
or settlement.
Baits appears to be sound and logical in its decision to abolish
lex loci delecti from intrafamily immunity cases. Many questions,
however, remain unanswered in light of the abolition of the family
immunity doctrine in tort actions by a parent against a child. The
court stated that it was not abrogating tort immunity in actions by
a child against a parent or between husband and wife. How long
will it take, however, for the rationale of this decision to permeate
these other areas? Insurance will no doubt be a decisive factor in
future cases, yet the uninsured as well as the insured will be
affected by this decision. Will the court allow such an action by a

36. See Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901);
Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Parks v. Parks, 390
Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
37. See cases cited note 30 supra.
38. 142 N.W.2d at 73. (Emphasis added.)
39. See Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (dissent);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
40. See Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); See also
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REV.
1030, 1072 (1930).'
41. 142 N.W.2d at 73.
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parent against a child where there is no family liability insurance?
Furthermore, how far will this decision reach into family activities beyond the operation of an automobile? It would seem unwise
for the court to extend this case into ordinary domestic activities
not involving the operation of a motor vehicle. Finally, this decision may force insurance companies to charge higher premiums to
pay the cost of anticipated litigation and claim settlements.
JERRY

B.

SILVER

DEFAMATION-THE SULLIVAN DOCTRINE
EXTENDED
Paulingv. Globe-Democrat,362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966)
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held in Pauting v.
Globe-Democrat' that libelous editorial comments concerning scientist Linus Pauling were privileged statements under the first
and fourteenth amendments unless actual malice be proved. Linus
Pauling, noted scientist, scholar and winner of the Nobel Prize for
Peace, has been critical of the United States' policy on nuclear testing. His actions in promoting a test ban treaty were subject to an
investigation by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Defendant
charged in an editorial comment that Pauling had been cited for
contempt during his appearance before that committee. 2 Although
defendant conceded that the statement was false, and therefore
libelous, suit was dismissed on the ground that the comments about
Pauling "fell into that area where first and fourteenth amendments
of the Constitution afford privilege to critical comments which are
free from malice."'3 The circuit court affirmed the dismissal, relying on the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan.4 Although the court admitted that the plaintiff did not come within the
category of a "public official" it justified application of the Sullivan doctrine on the ground that, "Professor Pauling, by his public
statements and actions was projecting himself into the arena of
vortex of the discussion of a
public controversy and into the very
'5
question of pressing public concern."
In Sullivan the Supreme Court for the first time applied the
first and fourteenth amendments to the law of libel and held that a
state's power to award damages in an action for libelous statements
against public officials based on their official conduct was limited
by the Federal Constitution. More specifically, the Court stated
1. 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
2. The alleged libel appeared in the October 10, 1960 edition of defendant's newspaper and consisted of the following:
Pauling contemptuously refused to testify and was cited for

contempt of Congress.

He appealed to the United States District

Court to rid him of the contempt citation, which the court refused
to do. The appeal from the lower court's affirmation of contempt
is expected to be handed down by the Supreme Court today.
3. 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. 362 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1966). The language concerning the
"vortex of discussion" comes from Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
In that case the Court used this phrase in noting that they were making

no decision as to whether such persons were under Sullivan.
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that such public officials must prove actual malice 6 on the part of
the defamer in order to recover. In so holding the Court sought to
encourage the free and uninhibited, but legitimate criticism which
is necessary to keep the representatives responsive and sensitive to
the people. Thus, the cases decided since Sullivan have struggled
with the question of how far down into the ranks of governmental service and employment the public official concept should
extend.8
The Pauling court was not altogether without precedent in
applying the qualified privilege of Sullivan to one who is not
elected, appointed or employed in a position involving public service or responsibility.9 This important factual distinction, however,
raises the question whether the rule applicable to public officials
should also apply to private citizens who are criticizing prevailing
policies.
To the extent that Sullivan is founded on the policy of encouraging responsible criticism of persons charged with the making
and administration of policy,10 the rule is clearly inapplicable to
Pauling. Although he may have felt a moral obligation to try and
influence public opinion, he was in no other respect responsible to
the public. Absent responsibility, there is no basis for depriving
him of the protection of the libel laws, which he would otherwise
have, against libelous criticism.
It may be argued, however, and not without some persuasive6. The court in Sullivan defined "actual malice" as a statement made
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." 376 U.S. at 280.
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823
(1964); see also Note, 51 VA. L. REV. 106 (1965).
9. See Pauling v. News Syndicate, 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964)
(dictum); Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965);
Walker v. Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1966); Pauling v. National
Review, 49 Misc.2d 975, 296 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Cf. Pearson v.
Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966). Decided about the
same time as the latest Pauling decision, the Pearson case held that the
noted columnist was not entitled to relief from non-malicious defamations
arising out of his vigorous commentary on Alaskan politics. The court
expressly disclaimed any reliance on the Sullivan rule. Rather, it called
the decision "a logical extension of the rule which accords a privilege to
one who passes judgment and comment on those things which are submitted
to the public for its approval, such as books, articles, advertisements, works
of art, and others." Id. at 713.
10. The court in Sullivan spoke of a "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376
U.S. at 270.
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ness, that any person who chooses to try and influence public policy
and public opinion on a national scale either assumes the risk of
harsh but legitimate criticism, or ought to have that burden thrust
upon him in the interest of full debate on the policy he advocates.
The answer, it is submitted, lies at the heart of the Sullivan decision. Pauling, a private citizen, is publicly urging change in his
country's policy. Sullivan encourages vigorous advocacy in his
efforts by providing a qualified immunity from suit should he make
defamatory statements about the public officials who make and
administer that policy. The Pauling decision imposes a substantial
risk, however, upon the exercise of this right to criticize. By entering the arena of public controversy he subjects himself, under
Pauling, to the full range of criticism with no remedy for defamation unless he can prove the presence of malice. The type of
spirited public discussion which Sullivan sought to encourage is
inhibited by Pauling.
The public official-private citizen distinction is important for
another reason. It should be noted that the qualified privilege extended by Sullivan has its counterpart: the public official who
must suffer the indignities of unmalicious defamations is himself
granted an absolute immunity from suit for any defamations committed in the discharge of his official duties. This corresponding
immunity was cited by the court in support of Sullivan.1 Certainly Pauling could claim no such official immunity. The counterpart of that immunity should not be accorded to his critics.
The concept of "public official" obviously will be subject to
varying interpretations until the Supreme Court chooses to clarify
its meaning. 12 The Pauling court has added the possibility of further uncertainty to an already troublesome question by extending
the qualified immunity to criticism of those who project themselves "into the arena of public controversy." Defining the limits of
this new "arena" could be considerably perplexing. Does the rule
apply only to persons active on a national scale? How much exposure is required; what is the effect of nationwide news coverage
on an otherwise local event. Should the rule apply only to those
active in political affairs, or should it also govern other nationally
known figures such as entertainment and sports personalities.
The Supreme Court in Sullivan chose to leave unanswered the
11. "Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct is appropriately
analogous to the protection accorded a public official when he is sued for
libel by a private citizen." 276 U.S. at 281, citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959). The court has since tried to minimize the importance of this
argument. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 38.3 U.S. 84, n. 10, (1966).
12. See cases cited note 8 supra.
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question of who could be considered a public official.'8 Misinterpretations of its ruling in that case lead to the conclusion that some
standard must now be set down so that priviate citizens will continue to freely exercise their right to criticize the government and
its officials.
GARY C. Hommn

13. "We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the
lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would
extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would not be included." 376 U.S. at 282, n. 23.
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